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Abstract
We study how relational contracts mitigate Beckers classic problem of providing gen-
eral (non-rm-specic) human capital when training contracts are incomplete. The rms
prot-maximizing agreement is a multi-period apprenticeship in which the novice is
trained gradually over time and eventually receives all knowledge. The rm adopts a 1
e
rule whereby at the beginning of the relationship the novice is trained, for free, just
enough to produce a fraction 1
e
of the e¢ cient output. After that, the novice earns all
additional knowledge with labor. This rule causes ine¢ ciently lengthy relationships that
grow longer the more patient the players. We discuss policy interventions.
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1 Introduction
As noted by Becker (1994[1964]), when an expert (master) trains a novice (apprentice),
knowledge cannot be used as collateral. Moreover, the novice often does not have the
means to pay the expert, up front, for the knowledge he or she wishes to acquire. Conse-
quently, the rst best allocation, in which knowledge is transferred as fast as technologi-
cally feasible, is not protable for the expert. This problem is present both in traditional
apprenticeships and in professional partnerships, where novices (e.g. associates) can
walk away at any time with the knowledge they have already acquired. Similarly, in
international joint ventures involving technological transfers between a northernand a
southernrm, the southern rm can potentially ignore formal agreements and establish
its own operations.
In this paper, we show that a dynamic self-enforcing contract, in which the novice is
trained gradually over time, mitigates Beckers problem: it allows the novice to eventually
acquire all knowledge from the expert, while at the same time allowing the expert to (par-
tially) get paid for it. We are also interested in describing the e¢ ciency and distributional
properties of this dynamic arrangement.
We set up a simple model in which an expert and a novice, both of whom are risk-
neutral, interact repeatedly over time. The expert (she) has a stock of general-purpose,
perfectly-divisible knowledge. The novice (he) has no knowledge, and therefore is not able
to produce output; he also has no cash, and therefore is not able to purchase knowledge
from the expert. By transferring knowledge, the expert raises the novices productivity.
The complication, however, is that at any time the novice may choose to leave the relation-
ship with the knowledge already acquired and enjoy the output he is able to produce, on
his own, with this knowledge. Since knowledge is non-contractable and general-purpose,
the only repercussion is an end to the playersinteractions.
To build a protable relationship in the face of the novices temptation to abandon
the expert, players rely on a (self-enforcing) multi-period agreement in which knowledge
is transferred gradually over time. Crucially, while being trained, the novice is willing to
accept wages below output, but only to the extent that he is compensated with additional
knowledge. In other words, the novice is willing to work only for future knowledge trans-
fers, not past ones. This constraint extends Beckers observation namely, that the novice
is not willing to accept wages below output to pay for past training to a multi-period
setting.
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The prot-maximizing contract is an apprenticeship (labor-for-training) arrange-
ment in which all knowledge is eventually transferred. After an initial knowledge gift,
which jump-starts the novices productivity, the novice is asked to work for the expert
and is paid only by means of additional training. Each period, the (present) value of the
additional knowledge received by the novice is just high enough to compensate him for the
output he gives up while working for the expert. The overall length of this apprenticeship
is controlled by the size of the initial knowledge gift, with a larger gift leading to an earlier
graduation.
When selecting the knowledge gift, the expert faces the following trade-o¤: by raising
the novices productivity, a larger gift allows the expert to more quickly extract revenues
from the novice; but a larger gift also reduces the remaining knowledge that the expert
is able to sell during the labor-for-training exchange. This trade-o¤ favors a lengthy
arrangement in which, despite the novice being trained slowly, the expert is able to charge
for most of her knowledge.
We nd that, no matter how patient the players, and regardless of the details of the
output technology, the prot-maximizing knowledge gift allows the novice to produce, at
the beginning of the relationship, a fraction 1
e
of the e¢ cient output level (where e is
the mathematical constant). This 1
e
rule implies that, for realistic discount rates, the
apprenticeship lasts many years. For example, when the annual interest rate is 10% (resp.
5%), training takes approximately 10 years (resp. 20 years) to complete. Regardless of
the interest rate, no less than a quarter of all potential output is wasted.
As players become more patient, the apprenticeship grows longer, knowledge is trans-
ferred more slowly, and less output is produced while the novice is being trained. The
reason is that, when patience increases, knowledge becomes more valuable in the mar-
gin, as the novice can use the acquired knowledge during every subsequent period of his
life. Consequently, in any given period, the novice is willing to work for the expert in
exchange for less additional knowledge; a fact that the expert exploits by (ine¢ ciently)
slowing down the speed of training and keeping the novices output for longer.
Next, we consider two policy experiments. These experiments are motivated by the
experts preference for articially lengthy apprenticeships, as well as by general commen-
tary on real-world masters exploitingtheir apprentices by means of contracts with low
wages and slow training (discussed in Section 2). First, we force the expert to pay the
novice a minimum wage during training. The result is an e¢ ciency gain: this policy
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leaves the contract length una¤ected (an implication of the experts 1
e
rule) and, at the
same time, uniformly accelerates the novices training. Second, we force the expert to
contain his interactions with the novice within a shorter horizon. The result is also an
e¢ ciency gain: the policy alters the experts optimal balance between knowledge gifted
and knowledge sold in favor of a larger gift and a faster sale. We also illustrate how both
of these policies may backre when the expert does not enjoy rents to begin with.
Finally, we study several extensions of the model. First, we show that when the
novice has concave utility, the contract remains very similar except for the fact that
expert grants the novice positive and increasing wages while being trained. Such wages
represent a compromise between delaying consumption (which allows the expert to more
quickly extract output from the novice) and smoothing consumption (which helps the
novice endure the apprenticeship). Secondly, we consider some brief extensions of practical
interest: the expert facing training costs, the novice arriving with capital, and the novice
causing externalities on the expert.1 These modications alter the contract exclusively
via the size of the initial knowledge gift. Lastly, we show that every Pareto-e¢ cient
agreement has the same overall structure as the prot-maximizing one, with the novices
Pareto-weight again a¤ecting only the size of the initial knowledge gift. Taken together,
these extensions suggest that the models core results are robust.
The human capital acquisition literature, since Beckers (1994[1964]) classic analysis,
shows that rms, in principle, will not pay for the general human capital of their workers
 if they did so, rms would not recoup their investment, as workers can always move
to another rm. A large literature has relied on market imperfections to explain, under
these circumstances, rmsincentives to train their workers. These imperfections include:
imperfect competition for workers (e.g. Stevens, 1994, Acemoglu, 1997, and Acemoglu
and Pischke, 1999a,b); asymmetric information about a workers training (e.g. Katz and
Ziderman, 1990, Chang and Wang, 1996, and Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998); and matching
frictions (Burdett and Smith, 1996, and Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1998). In our analysis,
in contrast, it is the timing of training, with gradual training combined with promises of
further training down the road, that supports the knowledge transfer.2
1Examples of externalities include an expert partner in a law rm benetting when a novice associate
becomes a more e¤ective problem solver, e.g., Garicano 2000, and an expert rm losing prots when
training a novice rm who then becomes a more e¤ective competitor.
2Alternatively, in learning-by-doing models (following, e.g., Heckman, 1971, Weiss, 1972, Rosen, 1972,
Killingsworth, 1982, and Shaw, 1989) skill accumulation is a by-product of work. Unlike in these models,
our principal has the exibility to determine the rate at which learning takes place independently of the
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A di¤erent literature studies the complementary problem of a rm that, to reward the
investments of its workers in specic human capital, attempts to build credible promises.
Prendergast (1993) argues that, when rms can commit to pay di¤erent wages across
tasks, the promise of promotions provides a solution. Relatedly, Kahn and Huberman
(1988) and Waldman (1990) argue that an up-or-out rule leads to credible promises, even
if the promoted worker has a similar productivity in all jobs.
Malcomson et al. (2003) study the training of workers using long-term apprenticeship
contracts with an initial period of low wages during which the training rm earns rents,
allowing it to recover its training costs. They study how asymmetric information, con-
cerning both the workers intrinsic ability and the rms training costs, which are absent
in our model, impact the workers training. In their model, all training occurs at the start
of the relationship, before the period of low wages is over.3 (In this setting, workers do not
leave before the low-wage period is over because their ability is not observed by competing
rms.) In our model, in contrast, the timing of training is endogenous, allowing us to
study how knowledge transfers are optimally spread out over time.
Our work is also related to the literature on principal-agent models with relational
contracts. There, akin to our model, self-enforcing rewards motivate the agent (a few
examples of this growing literature are Bull, 1987, MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989, 1998,
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1994, Levin, 2003, Rayo, 2007, Halac, 2012, Li and Ma-
touschek, 2013, Barron et al., 2015).4 This literature focuses on eliciting e¤ort from the
agent while treating the agents skill level as stationary and exogenous. In contrast, we
treat the agents skill as persistent and endogenous while assuming away e¤ort costs.5
Hörner and Skrzypacz (2010) study a separate challenge underlying knowledge trans-
amount of time the agent spends working.
3In this setting, apprenticeships involve a commitment to future wages (which is not possible in our
model). The authors show that a regulator can promote training by subsidizing rms and simultaneously
forcing them to o¤er contracts with longer periods of low wages after training is over (which is possible
in their setting because of information asymmetries). In our setting, in contrast, a regulator can increase
surplus by forcing rms to limit their knowledge transfers to a shorter training horizon, a consideration
absent in Malcomson et al. (2003). In our setting, since training is gradual, a second policy a minimum
wage during training may also be benecial.
4In an alternative setting, Bar-Isaac and Ganuza (2008) study the e¤ect of training on e¤ort in the
presence of career concerns.
5The dynamic enforcementconstraint that governs the provision of self-enforcing incentives takes a
di¤erent form across the two settings: in the costly-e¤ort setting, this constraint typically indicates that
self-enforcing money bonuses cannot exceed the (stationary) future surplus created by the relationship; in
the knowledge-transfer setting, it indicates that the output that can be extracted from the novice cannot
exceed the (shrinking) value of the knowledge yet to be gained by the novice (which represents only a
fraction of future surplus).
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fers: asymmetric information regarding the value of the knowledge to be sold. They show
that in an environment with limited enforceability, a privately-informed seller benets
from gradual revelation as a way to provide evidence regarding the quality of her infor-
mation, and therefore raise the price of the information yet to be sold.6 In our model, in
contrast, the value of information is known to all and gradual transmission is instead a
consequence of the buyer being liquidity-constrained i.e. requiring knowledge to produce
output and compensate the seller with it.
Finally, a related literature studies lender/borrower contracting under limited enforce-
ability (e.g. Thomas and Worrall, 1994, Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, 2004, DeMarzo
and Sannikov, 2006, Biais et al., 2007, and DeMarzo and Fishman, 2007). Limited en-
forceability means that the borrowers access to capital is restricted; therefore, his output
can grow at most gradually over time. In this lender/borrower setting, transactions in-
volve a single good (capital), whereas in our setting players trade knowledge for capital
(or, equivalently, for labor). As a result, the equilibrium contracts take a di¤erent form.
In the lender/borrower setting, absent uncertainty, players write debt contracts in which
debt payments are enforced via the threat of direct punishments on the borrower (i.e.
legal penalties and/or a reduction in the borrowers access to the productive technology).
In our setting, in contrast, after an initial knowledge gift  rather than a loan play-
ers engage in a series of knowledge-for-labor sales, and the reason they remain in the
relationship is to benet from future sales, rather than to avoid punishments.7
As Bulow and Rogo¤ (1989) show, in the lender/borrower setting, self-enforcing debt
contracts are only possible when direct punishments are available (otherwise, the agent
eventually prefers to unilaterally reinvest his output rather than using it to honor his debt).
In our setting, with knowledge being noncontractable and general-purpose, such direct
punishments are absent and, yet, are not needed to sustain a productive relationship.
Also novel to our setting is the economic trade-o¤ at the heart of the model: the fraction
of knowledge that the expert sells, rather than gifts, to the novice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some stylized facts
in expert-novice relationships. Sections 3 and 4 present the baseline model and derive
6Anton and Yao (2002) also consider the sale of information of unknown quality. In their model,
to signal quality, the seller reveals part of her information up front. After that, two rms compete to
purchase the remaining knowledge in a one-shot transaction.
7In both cases, provided he is risk-neutral, the agent postpones all consumption until after output has
reached its e¢ cient level. In the lender/borrower setting, foregoing consumption helps the agent more
quickly honor his debt; in our setting, it helps the agent more quickly purchase additional knowledge.
6
prot-maximizing (and Pareto-e¢ cient) contracts. Section 5, for robustness, considers
alternative timing options (including the continuous-time version of the baseline model).
Section 6 considers policy experiments and Section 7 considers extensions of the baseline
model. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Some stylized facts
Here we present some empirical observations, concerning knowledge transfers within and
between rms, that serve to motivate our analysis. These observations illustrate the
di¢ culties caused by a weak contracting environment and suggest that, often, the resulting
knowledge transfers are ine¢ ciently slow.
2.1 Apprenticeships, professional partnerships, and slow knowl-
edge transfers
It has long been observed that apprenticeships may be ine¢ ciently lengthy, and training
ine¢ ciently slow. According to Adam Smith, long apprenticeships are altogether un-
necessary... [If they were shorter, the] master, indeed, would be a loser. He would lose
all the wages of the apprentice, which he now saves, for seven years together (Smith,
1863:56). During the industrial revolution, in extreme cases, training would slow to a
crawl: [S]ome masters exploited these apprenticeshelpless situations, demanding vir-
tual slave labour, providing little in the way of food and clothing, and failing to teach the
novices the trade (Goloboy, 2008:3). Regarding musical trainees, McVeigh (2006:184)
notes: Since the master received any earnings from concert appearances, apprentices were
inevitably subject to exploitation [. . . ] Other apprentices he set to menial tasks. Burney
[the apprentice] recorded with irritation the drudgery he undertook for Arne [the master]
in the mid 1740s: Music copying, coaching singers and so on.
Similar observations are often made of present-day training relationships. According
to a UK government inquiry: Several apprentices reported that they were being used as
cheap labour [...] Typical responses from apprentices were that [...] they were used to do
menial tasks around the workplace(Dept. for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2013).
An important example of training relationships are those in professional service rms
e.g. law, consulting, architecture. These rms provide a wide range of general skills to
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junior consultants, usually called associates (see Richter et al., 2008). While in training,
associates pay their duesby grindingthrough menial tasks; in the process, rents are
extracted from their work in exchange for the promise of future training and eventual
promotion (see, for example, Maister, 1993).8
Consider law rms. There, as described by numerous blog posts and articles, associates
are frequently required to perform time-consuming menial tasks. According to a former
litigator, this recession may be the thing that delivers them from more 3,000-hour years
of such drudgery as changing the dates on securitization documents and shu­ ing them
from one side of the desk to the other... it often takes a forced exit to break the leash of
inertia that collars so many smart law graduates to mind-numbing work(Slater, 2009).
The more time associates spend on menial work, the less time they devote to learning the
advanced tasks such as building a case and rainmaking that they aspire to perform in
the future. As a result, training slows down. As an Australian Justice observes, young
solicitors are being exploited and overworked by law rms that have lost sight of their
traditional duty to nurture the next generation of lawyers(Merritt, 2013).9
In closing, the recent documentary Jiro Dreams of Sushiprovides a vivid example
of menial tasks and slow training in the restaurant industry. Jiro, a three-Michelin-star
sushi chef, possesses coveted skills. His apprentices must endure years of grueling work:
cleaning sh, cooking eggs, massaging octopus meat for 40-50 minutes at a time. As noted
by the food writer M. Yamamoto: When you work for Jiro, he teaches you for free. But,
you have to endure 10 years of training.All the while, the apprentices provide valuable
work (all the support work in the restaurant). These lengthy apprenticeships, however,
eventually pay o¤. In the words of Yamamoto: If you persevere for 10 years, you will
acquire the skills to be recognized as a rst-rate chef [and to have your own place].10
8Levin and Tadelis (2005) provide an alternative view of partnerships. There, partnerships serve as a
commitment device to provide high-quality service in a context of imperfect observability.
9Similar patterns of drudgery are found in a variety of industries, such as architecture, politics, and
entertainment (e.g. Ingalls, 2015, and Kasperkevic, 2016). For example, in entertainment, in a recent
class-action regarding the intern program at Fox Searchlight Pictures, a movie studio, the judge found
that the plainti¤ did not receive any formal training or education during his internship. He did not
acquire any new skills aside from those specic to Black Swans back o¢ ce, such as how it watermarked
scripts or how the photocopier or co¤ee maker operated. See US District Court of the Southern District
of New York, Eric Glatt et al., plainti¤s against Fox Searchlight Pictures.11 Civ. 6784 (WHP).
10Unpaid traineeships are a crucial part of the business model in upscale restaurants. For example,
at El Bulli, unpaid interns outnumbered paid chefs 2 to 1. Noma has 25 full-time chefs and around 30
interns. Aspiring chefs often learn little while spending long hours on menial tasks. In the words of the
famous Swedish chef Niklas Erdstad, the traineeship at El Bulli was close to slavery [...] You might as
well have been picking strawberries or peeling potatoes.(Fox, 2015).
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2.2 International joint ventures and limited contractability
International joint ventures between a northernrm in a developed country (the ex-
pert) and a southern rm in a developing country (the novice) frequently involve a
technology transfer in exchange for a cash ow. Often, owing to weak institutions in the
developing country, the partners cannot rely on legally-enforced contracts. As a result,
their relationship becomes analogous to one in which knowledge is transferred between two
individuals, with the novice free to walk away at any time with the acquired knowledge.
A notable example is the failed partnership of Danone and Wahaha. Their relation-
ship began in 1996 when Danone, a French drink and yogurt producer, established a joint
venture with the Hangzhou Wahaha group, a Chinese producer of milk drinks for chil-
dren. (See, for example, Financial Times, April 2007.)11 For Danone, the venture was
a way to prot from the growing Chinese market; for Wahaha, it was a means to learn
Danones technology. Initially, the joint venture was highly successful, contributing 5-
6% of Danones entire operating prots. However, in 2007, after Wahaha learned what it
needed, it set up a parallel organization that served its clients outside of the joint venture.
Danone appeared, legally, to have the upper hand, as it owned 51% of the joint venture.
However, this apparent power was not real. As noted by the press, the joint venture
depends on Mr. Zongs [Wahahas boss] continuing cooperation. Not only is he chairman
and general manager of the joint venture, but he is the driving force behind the entire
Wahaha organization. Furthermore, in China, employees in private enterprises often feel a
stronger loyalty to the boss than the organization itself. Winning in the courts or pushing
out Mr. Zong, therefore, are not solutions to Danones problems.(Financial Times, April
2007). Workers were strongly behind Zong: We formally warn Danone and the traitors
they hire, we will punish your sins. We only want Chairman Zong. Please get out of
Wahaha!(Financial Times, June 2007).12 In the end, Danone lost all its court battles
in China, and with them its trademarks.
The Danone-Wahaha case is far from unique; indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests
that these types of disputes are quite common. For example, in a case involving two
industrial machinery manufacturers, Ingersoll-Rand claimed that Liyang Zhengchang had
breached their joint-venture agreement by manufacturing and selling imitation processing
11How Danones China venture turned sour.FT. April 11, 2007. By Geo¤ Dyer.
12Still waters run deep in dispute at Wahaha.FT. June 12, 2007. By Geo¤ Dyer.
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equipment based on Ingersoll-Rands patents.13 Once again, the Chinese authorities sided
with the Chinese partner.
In the previous examples, the northern partner appears to have underestimated the
weakness of the legal institutions in question; as a result, it failed to appreciate the
dynamic inconsistency of the exchange. A case in which the northern partner seems fully
aware of such challenges is the auto-manufacturing alliance between General Motors (GM)
and the Chinese manufacturer SAIC. As GMs chairman points out: We have a good
and viable relationship and partnership. But to make it work, you have to have needs
on both sides of the table (Wall Street Journal, 2012).14 GM was careful to provide
enough knowledge to make the relationship valuable for SAIC: SAIC [...] went into the
partnership with big dreams but little know-how. Today the companies operate much
more like equals.At the same time, presumably mindful of the self-enforcing nature of
the relationship, GM has not yet transferred some of its key knowledge: GM is holding
tight to its more valuable technology. Beijing is eager to tap into foreign auto companies
clean-energy technologies. But GM doesnt want to share all its research with its Chinese
partner. Indeed, SAIC could use GM expertise and technology to transform itself into
a global auto powerhouse that challenges [GM] down the road.
3 Baseline model
There are two players: an expert (she) and a novice (he). Players interact over innite
periods t = 0; 1; ::: and discount future payo¤s using a common interest rate r > 0: Let
 = 1
1+r
denote the playersdiscount factor. The expert possesses one unit of general-
purpose knowledge. This knowledge is perfectly divisible, does not depreciate, and can
be transferred from the expert to the novice at any speed desired by the expert.
Let Xt 2 [0; 1] denote the novices stock of knowledge at the beginning of period t;
and let xt = Xt+1  Xt denote the additional knowledge transferred during period t: At
rst, the novice has no knowledge (X0 = 0). For the time being, to highlight the experts
desire for an articially slow knowledge transfer, we assume that the expert faces no costs
when training the novice.
During period t; the novice produces output yt = f(Xt); with f continuous and in-
132000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18449.
14Balancing the Give and Take in GMs Chinese Partnership.WSJ. August 19, 2012. By Sharon
Terlep.
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creasing.15 We assume that f(0) = 0 and so, in period 0, knowledge can be transferred
but no output is yet produced. One interpretation of the function f is that the novices
output originates from a variety of tasks, with more valuable tasks requiring more knowl-
edge. As the novice acquires knowledge, he e¢ ciently spends less time on menial tasks
and more on advanced ones.
Each period, the novice may either work for the expert or work for himself. Since
knowledge is general, output is the same in both cases. In what follows we assume that,
unless players separate, the novice works for the expert. (As we shall see, this assumption
is without loss.) The expert earns f (Xt) and compensates the novice by means of a
money transfer wt 2 R, which we call a wage, and a transfer of additional knowledge
Xt+1  Xt.
At the beginning of time, players agree on a relational contract : a self-enforcing agree-
ment that species, for each period, a knowledge stock Xt and a wage wt, conditional on
the players remaining together. We denote a relational contract by C = (Xt; wt)1t=0 (or
equivalently by C = (yt; wt)1t=0). For brevity, we call C a contract.
Both players are risk-neutral and care only about the present value of the money they
earn. For any given contract C, let t (C) and Vt (C) denote, respectively, the experts
and novices continuation payo¤s from the standpoint of the beginning of period t. These
continuation payo¤s are given by
t (C) =
1X
=t
 t [f (X )  w ] and Vt (C) =
1X
=t
 tw :
At the beginning of each period, players are free to walk away from the relationship.
When either player walks away, the expert earns no money from that period onwards
and the novice earns the present value of all output he can produce with the knowledge
already acquired, namely, 1
1 f(Xt): Therefore, in order for a contract to be honored, it
must satisfy the following two incentive constraints (the rst one for the expert and the
second one for the novice):
t (C)  0 for all t; (1)
Vt (C)  1
1  f(Xt) for all t: (2)
15Notice that the additional knowledge xt learned in period t is not put to use until the following
period. In Section 5, we consider the case in which yt = f(Xt + xt).
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We assume that players cannot walk away from the relationship mid-period. In other
words, players can commit to honor single-period transactions  in which they trade
labor for wages and training but have no commitment power beyond that.16
The novice has no access to credit and begins the relationship without any cash. (This
assumption implies that the novice cannot simply buy all knowledge from the expert up-
front.) As a result, the contract C must also satisfy the following liquidity constraint:
tX
=0
(1 + r)t w  0 for all t; (3)
which states that the novices cumulative earnings up to any given date t (including
interest) must be non-negative.
We have assumed that, unless players renege on the agreement, the novice works for
the expert. This assumption is without loss because a contract in which the novice works
for himself in any given period t is equivalent to a contract in which the novice instead
works for the expert during that period and earns a wage wt equal to his output yt:
Throughout most of the paper, we assume that the expert chooses the contract C with
the goal of maximizing her prots (namely, the expert has full bargaining power). This
case is relevant, for instance, when the market in question has a large supply of potential
novices and each expert is able to train only a limited number of them. The experts
prot-maximization problem is
max
C = (Xt;wt)1t=0
1X
t=0
t [f (Xt)  wt] (I)
s.t. (1), (2), (3)
(and subject to the knowledge stock Xt 2 [0; 1] being nondecreasing over time). At the
end of Section 4, we also study the broader set of Pareto-e¢ cient contracts that maximize
a weighted sum of the two playerspayo¤s.
Notice that the playerscombined surplus, 0 (C)+V0 (C) ; is equal to the present value
of output
P1
t=0 
tf(Xt): Thus, the rst-best allocation calls for a full knowledge transfer
in period 0. While this allocation is ideal from the perspective of the novice, it creates
16The following two alternative settings deliver the same results as the setting above: (1) the expert
has full commitment power and selects C up front; and (2) the expert can only commit to one-period
contracts and, at the beginning of each period, proposes  via a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er  a contract
(xt; wt) for that period.
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no value for the expert: as Becker (1994[1964]) pointed out, after receiving all knowledge,
the novice is not willing to work for wages below output.
Preliminaries. The initial period t = 0 is used by the expert to provide the novice
an initial level of training (which raises his knowledge stock from zero to X1) in order
to jump-start the novices productivity. Since the novice has no cash, the expert must
provide this initial training for free. We refer to X1 as the initial knowledge gift.
Once the initial knowledge gift is in place, the expert can prot from the novice by
trading knowledge for work, but is bound by the novices incentive constraint. Upon
rearranging terms, this constraint tells us that from any period t onwards, the overall
prots the expert can extract from the novice cannot be greater than the value of all
remaining knowledge transfers:17
1X
=t
 t
1
r
[f (X+1)  f (X )]| {z }
value of period- knowledge transfer

1X
=t
 t[f (X )  w ]| {z }
period- prots
= t (C) : (20)
The term 1
r
[f (X+1)  f (X )] measures the (present) value of the knowledge X+1 X
transferred in period  : (This term is multiplied by 1
r
because the additional knowledge
permanently raises the novices productivity.)
This constraint extends Beckers observation namely, that after he is trained, the
novice is not willing to accept wages below output to pay for that training to a multi-
period setting. Specically, when knowledge is transferred over multiple periods, the
novice is willing to accept wages below output, but only to the extent that he is compen-
sated with additional knowledge. In other words, the novice is only willing to work for
future knowledge transfers, not past ones.
Consequently, the expert faces a predicament: a larger knowledge stock in the hands
of the novice means that, each period, the novice can a¤ord to purchase more knowledge
with his work; but it also means that the expert has less knowledge left to sell.
17This expression is obtained from (2), namely, Vt (C)  11 f (Xt)  0, as follows. First, add t (C) to
both sides to obtain
t (C) + Vt (C)  1
1   f (Xt)  t (C) :
Second, note that the L.H.S. equals
P1
=t+1 
 t [f (X )  f (Xt)], which measures, in output terms,
the combined value of all subsequent knowledge transfers. Finally, note that this last expression
is equal to
P1
=t 
 t [f (X+1)  f (Xt)] =
P1
=t 
 t 
1  [f (X+1)  f (X+1)]   1 f (Xt) =P1
=t 
 t 1
r [f (X+1)  f (X )] ; as desired (where 1r = 1  ).
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Finally, if the expert completes the knowledge transfer in nite time, we say that
the novice graduates. Let the novices graduation date T be the rst period in which
knowledge is no longer transferred. Notice that from period T onwards, the players
combined incentive constraints require that the novice earns a per-period wage equal to
output (namely, wt = f (XT )).
4 Prot-maximizing contracts
Here we derive the experts optimal contract. To build intuition, we begin by studying
simple two-period contracts. We then turn to the general case in which the expert is free
to choose a contract of any length.18
4.1 Benchmark: two-period contracts
Here we consider two-period contracts in which, by assumption, the expert transfers all
knowledge by the end of period 1. These are the shortest contracts that allow the expert
to prot. From period 2 onward the novice earns a wage equal to output. As a result,
the experts only source of prots is the output produced in period 1.
The expert must decide how to split the knowledge transfer between periods 0 and
1. This decision is captured by the size of the initial knowledge gift X1: A larger gift
raises the novices period-1 productivity and therefore his ability to purchase additional
knowledge with his work but it also lowers the knowledge 1   X1 that is left for the
expert to sell. The expert must also select a period-1 wage w1. (In period 0; the expert
optimally pays zero wages.)
The experts problem is to maximize her period-1 prots:
max
X1;w1
f(X1)  w1
s.t. w1  0;
1
r
[f (1)  f (X1)]| {z }
value of remaining knowledge
 f(X1)  w1| {z } :
net output
18Throughout, to avoid knife-edge cases in which there is more than one solution, we assume  is
genericin the sense that 11  6= n for all n 2 N:
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Figure 1: two-period contract. As a function of X1, the value of the remaining knowledge
is decreasing and net output is increasing. For any given wage w1; the optimal X1 is at the
intersection of the two functions (where the novices incentive constraint binds). Raising
w1 shifts the net output function downward, reducing both the amount of knowledge sold
and the experts equilibrium prots.
The last constraint is the novices period-1 incentive constraint. It requires that the novice
be transferred knowledge 1 X1 with a value no smaller than the output he gives up, net
of wages, for the expert. (All other constraints in the experts original problem (I) are
automatically met.)
The solution, derived in Figure 1, is to set w1 = 0 and meet the incentive constraint
with equality. Namely, the expert just barely compensates the novice for his labor, and
compensates him exclusively by means of new knowledge: while positive wages can be
used to raise the novices gross output, they are not cost-e¤ective.
The prot-maximizing knowledge gift satises
f(X1)
f(1)
= :
When players are patient (e.g. time periods are short) almost 100% of knowledge is
gifted. Therefore, the arrangement is close to rst best. The reason is that, when it is
used frequently, knowledge has great value, allowing the transfer 1 X1 to be small.
This two-period arrangement, however, is of limited value for the expert: having only
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one period to exchange knowledge for work, she pockets only one period of output. Next,
we turn to longer (multi-period) arrangements. In these, the expert is able to lower the
knowledge gift and trade more knowledge for work. As a result, she pockets multiple
periods of output. (In this case, as we shall see, the arrangement is no longer close to
rst best. Moreover, as players become more patient, the overall knowledge transfer slows
down, rather than speeding up.)
4.2 General case: multi-period contracts
Here we return to the general case in which the expert is free to train the novice over any
number of periods. We begin by ruling out contracts in which training takes innitely
long:
Lemma 1 In every prot-maximizing contract, the novice graduates in nite time and is
transferred all available knowledge, namely, XT = 1 for some T .
Intuition is as follows:
 Finite graduation date. Suppose instead that training takes innitely long. Recall
that from any date onward, the overall prots the expert can extract from the novice
are no greater than the value of the knowledge yet to be transferred. Moreover, since
knowledge is nite, this value must necessarily approach zero as time goes by. As
a result, once the novice can a¤ord to buy all remaining knowledge with a single
period of work, the expert can choose to end the contract early and sell all this
knowledge at once. By doing so, the expert benets from earlier revenues.
 Full knowledge transfer. Since knowledge has positive value, the expert prots from
selling it all to the novice, in exchange for his work.
Next, we show that before graduation the novice earns zero wages and is instead
compensated through additional training:
Lemma 2 In every prot-maximizing contract, the novice earns zero wages before grad-
uation. As a result, during training, the novice is paid for his work exclusively by means
of additional knowledge.
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Figure 2: zero wages before graduation. Original contract, with graduation date T;
prescribes positive wages before graduation (bold functions). New contract delays all
wages until after date T 0 (dashed functions). In the new contract, the novice receives the
same total payo¤ (i.e. after discounting, area a = area b) but enjoys larger continuation
values.
For intuition, see Figure 2. Start with an arbitrary contract with graduation date T
and positive wages before graduation. Now consider an alternative contract in which the
expert pays zero wages before a date T 0 < T and pays wages f (1) after that, with T 0
chosen so that the total wage bill remains constant in present value. This modication
does not a¤ect the novices payo¤. However, since the novice must wait longer to earn
his wages, his continuation values Vt grow and his incentive constraints Vt  11 f (Xt)
become slack. As a result, the expert is able to increase the novices knowledge level 
and raise his output while still keeping him in the relationship. In doing so, the expert
increases his prots while leaving the novices payo¤ unchanged.19
Once all pre-graduation wages are set to zero, the novices incentive constraints become
(using (20)):
T 1X
=t
 t
1
r
[f (X+1)  f (X )] 
T 1X
=t
 tf (X ) :
19Notice that the expert is now able to transfer all knowledge by date T 0 (since wages equal f (1) from
that date onward). We therefore learn that any contract with positive wages ahead of its graduation date
T is dominated by a contract with an earlier graduation T 0 and zero wages ahead of graduation.
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Thus, in order to retain the novice, it su¢ ces that, period-by-period, the knowledge
transfer X+1   X has a value equal to the novices output f (X ) : When instead the
value of the period- knowledge transfer exceeds f (X ), we say that a portion of this
transfer is gifted.
We are now ready to describe the structure of every prot-maximizing contract:
Proposition 1 In the baseline model, every prot-maximizing contract has the following
structure. In period 0, the novice receives a knowledge gift. Next, during every period
after the gift and before graduation, the novice works for zero wages and the value of the
additional knowledge he learns is equal to the output he produces for the expert:
1
r
[f (Xt+1)  f (Xt)]| {z }
value of knowledge transfer
= f (Xt) : (4)
This training process continues until 100% of knowledge has been transferred, after which
the novice graduates and earns, each period, a wage equal to the maximum output f (1).
Proposition 1 tells us that a prot-maximizing contract is a type of apprenticeship
in which the novice receives no wages while in training. After an initial knowledge gift,
the novice receives just enough additional knowledge, every period, to compensate him
for the output he gives up. The overall length of the apprenticeship is controlled by the
size of the knowledge gift. Since a larger gift increases the novices productivity and all
subsequent knowledge transfers it leads to an earlier graduation.
Equation (4) in the proposition tells us that, beyond period 0, the novice does not
receive any knowledge gifts. Intuitively, recall that the novice does not require any gifts
to endure his training. As a result, the only benet the expert derives from such gifts
is a higher productivity before graduation. But since an earlier gift raises productivity
sooner, it is best to place all gifts up front, at the beginning of the relationship.20
Before we proceed, two remarks are in order:
1. When selecting the initial knowledge gift, the expert faces the following trade-o¤:
by raising the novices productivity, a larger gift means that the novice can a¤ord
20Formally, when the novice receives a knowledge gift during period t  1; namely,
1
r [f (Xt+1)  f (Xt)] > f (Xt), his incentive constraint for that period is slack. As a result, the ex-
pert can increase prots by raising f (Xt) while holding f (Xt+1) constant, which in turn is achieved by
lowering xt and increasing xt 1 namely, by moving the knowledge gift one period ahead.
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to buy (with his work) more knowledge per period of training, leading to earlier
revenues for the expert, but it also means that the expert has less knowledge left
to sell overall. As we shall see, this trade-o¤ results in lengthy contracts in which
signicant output is wasted.
2. Equation (4) can be written more compactly as 1
r
yt+1 = yt; where yt+1 =
f (Xt+1)   f (Xt). Consequently, after the initial knowledge gift, output grows at
rate r until it reaches its maximum value. To see why, notice that for each dollar of
output yt+1 produced with new knowledge, the novice gains, in present value, 1r
dollars. Therefore, for each dollar of output yt produced today, it su¢ ces to grant
the novice, as compensation, new knowledge worth r dollars per-period.
4.3 Prot-maximizing contracts in closed form: a 1e rule
Here we derive the prot-maximizing knowledge gift and apprenticeship length. In what
follows, we make use of both the e¤ective interest rate r and the nominal (instantaneous)
interest rate r0 = log (1 + r). (Recall that  = 11+r = e
 r0 ; which we also use below in
order to avoid clutter.)
Recall that after the initial gift X1, output grows at rate r until the knowledge transfer
is complete. Therefore, the novices last period of training, T   1, is equal to the number
of periods of compound growth at rate r required for output to reach f(1); starting from
f(X1). Namely, (1 + r)
T 1 f (X1) = f (1) : From this expression, we can solve for the
novices graduation date as a function of X1, which we denote T (X1):
T (X1) = 1 + 1
r0
log

f (1)
f (X1)

:
In addition, while the novice is being trained, his discounted per-period output t 1f (Xt)
(measured here in period 1 dollars) remains constant and equal to f (X1) (which in turn
equals T 1f (1)). During T   1 periods, the expert pockets this output.
We are now ready to express the experts problem in reduced form, either as a function
of X1 or, equivalently, as a function of T :
max
X1
1
r0
log

f (1)
f (X1)

| {z }
T 1
 f(X1)| {z }
discounted per-period prot
(II)
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= max
T
(T   1)  T 1f (1)| {z }
f(X1)
subject to the graduation date (T (X1) in the rst problem and T in the second problem)
being an integer.
The objective function in either of these problems summarizes the experts trade-o¤:
a higher gift raises the novices productivity and so the expert enjoys higher revenues
during each period while the novice is being trained (second term), but it also means
that the expert has less knowledge left to trade for labor while also trading more of
this knowledge every period  and therefore the novice graduates sooner (rst term).
Proposition 2 describes the solution:
Proposition 2 Up to an integer constraint for the novices graduation date, the prot-
maximizing knowledge gift X1 satises
f (X1)
f (1)
=
1
e
;
where e is Eulers number. As a result, the novices graduation date is 1
r0
+ 1; which is
decreasing in r0 (namely, increasing in ) and independent of the production technology.21
This result tells us that no matter how patient the players, and regardless of the details
of the output technology, the expert optimally balances her conicting goals by allowing
the novice to produce, at the start of the apprenticeship, a share 1
e
of the e¢ cient output
level. Indeed, upon dividing the objective in (II) by the constant f (1) ; we learn that the
experts problem is equivalent to maximizing the average logarithm 1
z
log z of the output
ratio z = f(1)
f(X1)
: The maximum is achieved when this ratio is e: As for the optimal T , note
that (T   1)T 1f (1) is maximized at T   1 =   1
log 
= 1
r0
:22
This solution is reminiscent of the solution to the secretary problem in which a
recruiter who faces a queue of job applicants of unknown quality must decide what fraction
of applicants to sample before making any hiring decision (e.g. Bruss, 1984). As the total
21When 1r0 + 1 is not an integer, the knowledge gift is adjusted until the graduation date equals the
integer directly above/below 1r0 + 1. When players meet frequently (r0 is close to zero) such adjustment
is small. (An analogous observation applies to Corollaries 1 and 3 and to the extensions in Section 7.2.)
22The rst-order condition for T   1 is T 1 + (T   1) T 1 log  = 0 and the second-order condition is
T 1 log  < 0:
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number of applicants tends to innity, the optimal sample converges to a fraction 1
e
of
all applicants (a result sometimes called a 1
e
law). The two problems, however, do not
appear to have any direct economic link. In addition, unlike in the secretary problem, we
obtain a 1
e
rule for transactions of nite duration.23
Notice that the prot-maximizing apprenticeship is longer, and knowledge is trans-
ferred more slowly, the more patient the players are. Intuitively, when patience increases
knowledge becomes more valuable in the margin as the novice can use what he learns
throughout the rest of his life. As a result, the novice is willing to work, each period, for
less additional knowledge. The expert takes advantage of this fact by stretching out the
novices training and pocketing his output for longer.
Consistent with the real-world practices noted in Section 2, the experts 1
e
rule causes
lengthy apprenticeships. To illustrate, suppose players meet n times per year and let
rA = n  r0 denote the annual nominal interest rate. Then, beyond the initial knowledge
gift, the novices training takes 1
rA
years to complete for example, 10 years when rA =
10% and 20 years when rA = 5%.24 Finally, the deadweight loss caused by the expert is
at least e 2
e
 1
r
f (1) dollars. Namely, a share no smaller than e 2
e
' 26% of the highest
attainable surplus 1
r
f (1).25
4.4 Pareto-e¢ cient contracts
Here we characterize the broader set of Pareto-e¢ cient contracts. Namely, we solve the
problem of a Planner who maximizes a weighted sum of the playerspayo¤s, V0(C) +
0(C), subject to the same constraints as the original problem (I). The parameter   0
is the novices Pareto weight.26 Note that this exercise is equivalent to maximizing the
payo¤ of one player subject to guaranteeing a given payo¤ for the other. (For example, a
guaranteed payo¤ for the expert may allow her to recover a xed cost; and a guaranteed
payo¤ for the novice may serve as compensation for a forgone opportunity.)
Corollary 1 Suppose C is a Pareto-e¢ cient contract namely, it solves the Planners
problem for a given . Then:
23We are grateful to Thomas Bruss for providing insights into the secretary problem.
24Beyond the gift, training consumes 1n (T (X1)  1) years, which from Proposition 2 equals 1nr0 :
25Measured in date-0 dollars, the deadweight loss  output lost relative to rst best  is

Pr 10
t=1

t 1   1e

f(1): As r falls, this expression grows, but it grows slower than 1rf (1) does.
26Below, to guarantee a unique solution, we assume that 1 1  6= n for all n 2 N:
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A. C has all properties in Proposition 1. That is, the novice earns zero wages while
in training, graduates at a nite date T with all knowledge, and earns f (1) per period
from that date onward. Moreover, after the initial gift X1, and before his graduation, the
novice acquires knowledge according to the rule 1
r
[f (Xt+1)  f (Xt)] = f (Xt).
B. Up to an integer constraint for the novices graduation date, the initial knowledge
gift satises
f(X1)
f(1)
= min

1
e1 A
; 1

;
where A = r0
1 e r0 > 1:
27 As a result, T = 1
r0
max f1  A; 0g + 1. In other words, as 
increases, the novice is gifted more knowledge, and graduates earlier, up to the point in
which he is gifted 100% of knowledge and graduates immediately (T = 1).
Part A tells us that every Pareto-e¢ cient contract is identical except for the novices
date of graduation T (with an earlier graduation corresponding to a larger initial gift X1).
The novices payo¤, equal to the present value of wages 
T
1 f (1) ; is decreasing in T . In
contrast, the experts payo¤ is increasing in T up to the prot-maximizing date 1
r0
+ 1:
Consequently, the Pareto-frontier is traced by varying T between 1 (the ideal contract
for the novice) and 1
r0
+ 1 (the ideal contract for the expert) while varying the initial gift
accordingly.28
Note that every Pareto-e¢ cient contract prescribes zero wages before graduation. The
intuition is the same as that for Lemma 2 (Section 4.2). Here we o¤er a reminder of this
intuition.
Fix the novices total wage payments in present value (i.e. x the novices total payo¤).
By delaying all wage payments until after graduation, the expert strengthens the novices
incentive to remain in the relationship while being trained that is, the expert relaxes
the novices incentive constraints. Consequently, the expert is able to transfer additional
knowledge and, by doing so, is able to raise the novices productivity. The result is a
Pareto improvement in the form of a higher prot for the expert and the same payo¤ for
the novice.
Notice also that after the initial knowledge gift, the knowledge transferred each period
just barely compensates the novice for his work (per the rule 1
r
[yt+1   yt] = yt). In other
27The constant A arises because time is discrete. When time periods are short, A  1.
28In principle, one could consider contracts with T = 1 plus a positive money transfer w0 up front,
which would further raise the novices payo¤. This transfer, however, would lead to negative prots and
therefore violate the experts incentive constraint.
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words, the novice receives a single large knowledge gift, up front, rather than several
smaller knowledge gifts over time. This feature ensures that the novices productivity is
raised as early as possible.
Part B of the Corollary o¤ers a formal characterization of the Pareto frontier. As 
grows, the novice acquires knowledge more quickly and graduates earlier. As a result,
total surplus (the present value of output) also increases.29 As soon as  reaches 1
A
< 1,
all knowledge is gifted and the novice graduates immediately (T = 1). In this case, the
contract is rst best.
5 Alternative Timing
Here, as a robustness exercise, we consider two variations of the model, each involving a
di¤erent timing of events.
First, we assume that the additional knowledge learned in period t; denoted xt; can
be used for production during that same period. Namely, period t output is f (Xt + xt),
rather than f (Xt) : The only di¤erence in the results is that the expert accelerates the
knowledge transfer so that the novice graduates one period earlier than before. When
time periods are short and therefore the novice is trained over a large number of periods
the two settings are virtually identical.
Second, we consider a continuous-time setting (in which the above timing choice is
immaterial). Other than dispensing with the integer constraint for T , the results are
identical to the baseline model.
5.1 Alternative timing in the discrete-time model
Suppose the additional knowledge xt acquired in period t can be used for production
during that same period i.e. period t output is f(Xt+xt) = f (Xt+1) ; rather than f (Xt) ;
while all other aspects of the model are unchanged. In this case, in any given period, the
novice is able to produce a higher output working for the expert (i.e. f (Xt + xt)) than
working for himself (i.e. f (Xt)). In other words, the additional knowledge acquired each
period is, e¤ectively, rm-specic throughout that period. As a result, the expert has
29The allocation of surplus ranges from an approximately 50-50 split (which is exact when time is
continuous) to 100% of surplus going to the novice.
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a greater ability to prot from the novice. Below, for notational clarity, we refer to the
initial (period 0) knowledge transfer as x0; as opposed to X1:
As shown in the Supplement, Proposition 1 remains valid. The only di¤erence is that,
per equation (4), which still holds, the value of the additional knowledge that the novice
learns in period t is now equal to his opportunity cost of working for the expert (i.e.
f (Xt)), rather than the actual output he produces for the expert (i.e. f (Xt + xt)).
As before, after the initial knowledge transfer x0, the expert allows f (Xt) to grow at
rate r until she transfers 100% of knowledge (per equation (4)).30 As a result, while training
takes place, output remains constant in present value namely, tf (Xt + xt) = f (x0) for
all t = 1; :::; T  1: (Moreover, since XT 1 + xT 1 = XT = 1; we have f (x0) = T 1f (1).)
What changes is that, by construction, the expert begins to prot in period 0; in which
the novice produces f(x0): As a result, the expert obtains T periods of prots (from 0 to
T   1), rather T   1 periods only (from 1 to T   1). Her total prots, measured in period
0 dollars, are now
TT 1f (1)| {z }
f(x0)
:
Ignoring the integer constraint for T; this payo¤ is maximized at T = 1
r0
; instead of
T = 1
r0
+ 1 (as in the baseline model). Accordingly, the initial knowledge transfer x0 now
satises31
f (x0)
f (1)
=
1
e
(1 + r) ;
instead of f(x0)
f(1)
= 1
e
. In other words, given that the expert begins to prot from the novice
one period sooner, she is willing to let him graduate one period sooner as well.
Note that when r is small (i.e. each time period is short) the two versions of the model
deliver virtually identical results. The reason is that, in this case, the output produced
in any given period is small relative to the total value of knowledge. As a result, it makes
little di¤erence to the expert that she is able to extract an additional period of output
from the novice.
Finally, the alternative timing opens the possibility that the expert chooses an e¢ cient
outcome. The reason is that, de facto, knowledge is specic throughout the period in which
30Also as before, the novices binding incentive constraints are Vt = 
T t
1  f(1) =
1
1 f (Xt) : Conse-
quently, f (Xt + xt) = f (Xt+1) = 
T t 1f(1) for all t < T:
31When the integer constraint is introduced, the novice graduates either at date
l
1
r0
m
or at date
j
1
r0
k
;
and the ratio f(x0)f(1) is adjusted accordingly.
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it is rst transferred. As a result, the expert can adopt a one-period contract in which
she transfers 100% of knowledge up front (during period 0), she pockets one period of
output f (1) (also during period 0), and lets the novice graduate immediately after that
(in period 1).32
From the experts standpoint, however, this one-period contract has a drawback: the
expert receives a single period of output f (1) in exchange for a knowledge transfer that is
worth 1
r
f (1) to the novice. Consequently, this contract is prot-maximizing if and only if
the (one-period) interest rate r is very large, namely, r  100%:33 For lower levels of r, as
in the baseline model, the expert prefers a multi-period contract in which she articially
delays the knowledge transfer in order to extract more periods of output.
5.2 Continuous-time model
Suppose time t runs continuously. Accordingly, f (Xt) and wt represent the instantaneous
output and wages at time t. As before, T is the date of graduation and  = e r0 . (We
start counting time at t = 1 so that, as in the baseline model, t = 1 is the rst period
with positive output.)
The optimal (prot-maximizing) contract is the continuous-time equivalent of the
optimal contract in the baseline model (described in Proposition 1).34 That is, after the
novice is gifted knowledge X1, his output grows continuously at rate r0 until it reaches
f (1) : (Analogous to (4), at each instant the value of the knowledge transfer 1
r0
d
dt
f (Xt)
equals f (Xt).) As a result, for all t  T; output is f (Xt) = e r0(T t)f (1) = T tf (1).
Moreover, while being trained, the novice earns zero wages.
Notice, therefore, that the experts problem boils down to maximizing a simple objec-
tive (expressed here as a function of T ):Z T
1
t 1f (Xt) dt| {z }
output while novice is in training
= T 1f (1)| {z }
f(X1)
 (T   1) :
32Under the baseline timing, in contrast, since output is fully general, the shortest protable contract
is two periods long. As a result, the expert always chooses an ine¢ cient outcome.
33Indeed, the objective TT 1f (1) is maximized at T = 1 (among integer values of T ) if and only if
 = 11+r  12 :
Similarly, in the baseline model, the shortest protable contract in that case, a two-period contract
 is optimal for the expert if and only if r  100%: Indeed, the baseline objective (T   1) T 1f (1) is
maximized at T = 2 (among integer values of T ) if and only if  = 11+r  12 :
34For a proof, see Supplement (Proposition 4).
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This objective is maximized by setting T   1 = 1
r0
: Consequently, the novice graduates at
date 1
r0
+ 1 and the knowledge gift satises f(X1)
f(1)
= 1
e
; exactly as in the baseline model 
but with no integer constraint for T .
6 Policy experiments
Governments are interested in encouraging rms to o¤er apprenticeships that grant sig-
nicant benets to apprentices. For instance, in a recent meeting in Guadalajara, Mex-
ico, the G20 ministers declared themselves committed to promote, and when necessary,
strengthen quality apprenticeship systems that ensure high level of instruction [...] and
avoid taking advantage of lower salaries(OECD, 2012).35 As the OECD put it, Quality
apprenticeships require good governance to prevent misuse as a form of cheap labour.36
Motivated by such concerns, we consider two policy experiments: a minimum wage
during training and a limit on the apprenticeships duration. The discussion that follows
presumes that the expert earns su¢ cient rents from the relationship that she remains
interested in training the novice even after the loss in prots caused by these policies. If
instead the expert earns no rents, the policies may easily backre, as illustrated below.
Minimum wage. Suppose a planner forces the expert to pay the novice, during each
period of the relationship, a wage no smaller than wmin. Assume that 0 < wmin < f(1).
Corollary 2 tells us that the prot-maximizing contract retains the basic properties of
the apprenticeship characterized in Proposition 1:
Corollary 2 When the expert is required to pay a minimum wage wmin, every prot-
maximizing contract has the following structure. In period 0, the novice receives a knowl-
edge gift. Next, during every period after the gift and before graduation, the novice receives
wage wmin and the value of the additional knowledge he learns is equal to the net output
35OECD Note on Quality Apprenticeships for the G20 Task Force on Employment. September,
2012. (http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/OECD%20Apprenticeship%20Note%2026%20Sept.pdf.)
36Governments have long been interested in regulating apprenticeships. See, for example, Malcomson
et al. (2003) for a discussion and Elbaum (1989) for a historical perspective. Malcomson et al. consider a
type of regulation (which we do not consider) whereby rms are forced to pay low wages over a minimum
time period after training is over. They show that this seemingly counter-intuitive regulation may be
benecial when information asymmetries prevent workers from leaving the rm, and the rm is capable
of committing to future wages.
26
f (Xt)  wmin he produces for the expert:
1
r
[f (Xt+1)  f (Xt)]| {z }
value of knowledge transfer
= f (Xt)  wmin: (5)
This training process continues until 100% of knowledge has been transferred, after which
the novice graduates and earns, each period, a wage equal to the maximum output f (1).
As in the baseline model, the expert concentrates the knowledge gift in the rst period,
after which she just barely compensates the novice for his work. The di¤erence is that,
since the novice is compensated with a combination of money and new knowledge, the
minimum wage partially crowds out the transfer of new knowledge. Consequently, for any
xed knowledge gift, the policy delays the novices graduation.
We now express the experts problem in reduced form. Recall that in the baseline
model, after the initial gift, output grows at rate r until training is complete. Under the
minimum wage policy, it is net output f(Xt)  wmin that grows at rate r until it reaches
f (1) wmin (which can be seen from (5)). As a result, the graduation date T now satises
(1 + r)T 1 [f (X1)  wmin] = f (1)   wmin: In addition, throughout the training process,
the experts per-period discounted prots t 1 [f(Xt)  wmin] remain constant and equal
to f(X1) wmin (in period-1 dollars). The expert collects these prots over T  1 periods.
The experts reduced-form problem is therefore identical to the original problem (II),
but with net output (net of the minimum wage) in the place of gross output:
max
X1
1
r0
log

f (1)  wmin
f (X1)  wmin

| {z }
T 1
 [f(X1)  wmin]| {z }
discounted per-period prot
(III)
= max
T
(T   1)  T 1 [f (1)  wmin]| {z }
f(X1) wmin
subject to the resulting graduation date being an integer. Corollary 3 describes the
solution:
Corollary 3 Suppose the expert is required to pay a minimum wage wmin. Up to an
integer constraint for the novices graduation date, the prot-maximizing knowledge gift
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X1 satises
f (X1)  wmin
f (1)  wmin =
1
e
:
Consequently, the novices graduation date (given by 1
r0
+1) is independent of wmin: More-
over, the novices output before graduation is uniformly increasing in wmin:
The expert confronts the policy by raising the initial knowledge gift while holding
constant the length of the apprenticeship. As a result, the policy shifts the output path
upward and, at the same time, reduces its slope. The policy, therefore, raises total surplus
(i.e. total output in present value). The policy also increases the novices payo¤, as he
now enjoys positive earnings before graduation.
Intuitively, from the standpoint of the expert, the minimum wage is equivalent to a
constant reduction in f: Recall from the baseline model that the length of the appren-
ticeship is not a¤ected by the details of f ; therefore, the minimum wage does not a¤ect
the length of the apprenticeship either. Actual output, however, grows with the mini-
mum wage. The reason is that, from the experts perspective, the minimum wage makes
the novice less productive. The expert (partially) counteracts this lower productivity by
raising the novices knowledge stock.
While the minimum wage policy raises total surplus vis-a-vis the prot-maximizing
contract, it is not itself a Pareto-e¢ cient policy. The reason, as we argued in Section 4.4,
is that the e¢ cient way to raise the novices payo¤ is by means of an earlier graduation,
not by means of positive wages ahead of graduation i.e. delaying wages strengthens the
novices incentive to remain in the relationship while being trained, which in turn allows
the expert to trust him with additional knowledge.
Limit on apprenticeship duration. Suppose the planner requires, instead, that the
expert ends the apprenticeship before some maximum number Tmax of periods. This
policy, when binding, reduces the number of periods during which the expert can exchange
knowledge for work, forcing the expert to speed up the exchange. The result is a higher
knowledge gift and a uniformly higher level of output. As a result, this policy also raises
total surplus. Moreover, in contrast to the minimum wage policy, this policy is Pareto-
e¢ cient (as it impacts the novices date of graduation only).
It is worth noting that both these policies may backre when the expert does not enjoy
rents to begin with. For a simple example, suppose many experts compete for the novice
and each one must pay a xed cost F when contracting with him. In this case, experts
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o¤er the novice an apprenticeship just long enough for them to recover F . If experts are
now required to pay a minimum wage, they must delay the novices graduation, and slow
down his training, simply to break even (assuming they are still able to do so). As a result,
there is an e¢ ciency loss.37 Even worse, if experts are forced to reduce the duration of
the apprenticeship below its original equilibrium level, it is impossible for them to recover
F . As a result, they do not enter the market.
7 Extensions
Here we study the case in which the novice has concave utility, as well as other simple
extensions of practical interest.
7.1 Consumption smoothing
Suppose the novice has concave utility. Let ct denote the novices period t consumption
and let the novices payo¤ from period t onward be Vt =
P1
=t 
 tu (c ) : For tractability,
we assume that the novice has constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES),
namely, u (c) = c
1 
1  for some  > 0.
Since the novice has no ability to borrow, we set ct = wt if the novice works for the
expert, and ct = yt if he walks away from the relationship.38 Other than the novices
incentive constraints, which are now 1
1 u (yt)  Vt; the experts problem is identical to
that in the baseline model.
Proposition 3 Suppose the novice has CIES utility with parameter . Then, every prot-
maximizing contract is such that, after the initial gift and before graduation,
1
r
[u(yt+1)  u(yt)]| {z }
value of knowledge transfer
= u(yt)  u(wt):| {z }
cost of working for expert
Moreover, wt = (1  ) 1Yt; with Yt =
 Pt
=1 y


 1
 :
37The knowledge gift is now given by the largest value of X1 such that [f(X1)  wmin] 
[T (X1; wmin)  1]  F: The reader can verify that as wmin grows, X1 falls, the graduation date grows, and
output f (Xt), which satises f (Xt) wmin = (1 + r)t 1 [f(X1)  wmin] ; uniformly falls during training.
38Since the wages prescribed by the optimal contract are non-decreasing over time (as we show below),
the novice has no incentive to save either.
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Akin to the baseline model, the value of the period-t knowledge transfer equals the
cost of working for the expert, now measured in utility terms. Moreover, the contract
now prescribes an increasing wage path. Intuitively, this path is a compromise between
delaying wages (which accelerates the knowledge transfer) and smoothing consumption
(which helps the novice endure his training). Moreover, since knowledge is more valuable
the earlier it is acquired, the consumption path is skewed toward the future. As an
example, in the case of log utility ( = 1), Yt is the cumulative output produced up to
period t: As a result, the wage path is both increasing and convex.
We derive the remaining details numerically (see Figure 3 below).39 The results are
as follows:
1. As the novices intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1

falls, he consumes a higher
fraction of output during training. Consequently, the knowledge transfer slows down
and the apprenticeship becomes longer and is always longer than in the baseline
model (Figure 3.A).
2. As in the baseline model, when players become more patient, training is slowed
down and output is uniformly reduced. The reason is that, when  grows, knowledge
becomes more valuable, leading the expert to take longer to sell it (Figure 3.B).
3. Also as in the baseline model, imposing a minimum wage uniformly increases out-
put. The reason is that the expert partially counteracts the expense caused by
the minimum wage by transferring additional knowledge especially early in the
relationship, when the minimum wage is binding (Figure 3.C).
7.2 Other motives for altering the apprenticeship length
The baseline model can be readily extended along several other dimensions. Here we de-
scribe some examples. In all of them, the prot-maximizing contracts are apprenticeships
with the properties in Proposition 1.40 Therefore, they di¤er from one another only in
the initial knowledge transfer X1 and, potentially, a money transfer.
39We obtain the optimal contract by searching (numerically) for the prot-maximizing value of T while
imposing that, for each candidate T; the prole (yt; wt)
T 1
t=1 solves the 2(T 1) equations in the proposition
(which have a unique solution).
40The proof of this claim, available upon request, is a straightforward extension of the proof of Propo-
sition 1.
30
Training costs. When training costs are introduced, the apprenticeship may further
slow down. Suppose, for example, that transferring additional knowledge X 0 X; starting
from stock X; costs the expert  1
r
[f (X 0)  f (X)] for some constant  2 (0; 1) (namely,
the cost is a constant fraction of the value of the additional knowledge).41 Once this cost
is considered, the prot-maximizing knowledge gift satises
f(X1)
f(1)
=
1
e1+B
;
where B = 
1 
h
r0
1 e r0
i
(recall that the constant in brackets, resulting from time being
discrete, is approximately 1 when r0 is small). Consequently, a higher  results in a
smaller gift and a more distant graduation.
Novices liquidity. Suppose that, at the beginning of the relationship, the novice
has capital L; with 0 < L < 1
r
f (1) :42 In this case, the expert asks the novice to surrender
all his capital up front and, in return, o¤ers him an apprenticeship with the features in
Proposition 1 namely, a Pareto-e¢ cient contract. Recall that, in such an apprenticeship,
the novice enjoys (gross) rents 1
r
f (X1) (the present value of X1). Therefore, the novices
participation constraint is 1
r
f (X1)  L.
Notice that when X1 takes its baseline value (
f(X1)
f(1)
= 1
e
), the novice enjoys rents 1
r
f(1)
e
.
Therefore, the prot-maximizing X1 is obtained as follows: if the baseline rents exceed
L; the expert simply pockets the novices capital; otherwise, the expert raises X1 above
its baseline level until 1
r
f (X1) = L. As a result, the novices access to capital weakly
accelerates the knowledge transfer. Moreover, it weakly decreases the novices payo¤.
Externalities. In practice, the expert may experience externalities as the novice gains
knowledge. For example, a partner in a law rm benets when an associate becomes a
more e¤ective helper (e.g. Garicano, 2000). Alternatively, a northern rm loses prots
when a southern rm learns from it and becomes a stronger competitor (as may potentially
occur in the GM-SAIC case discussed in Section 2). For a simple formalization, suppose
that, in addition to collecting revenues from the novice, the expert herself produces output
41The experts reduced-form objective, viewed from the standpoint of period 1, is now [T (X1)  1] (1 
)f(X1)    1+rr f (X1) (since, from Proposition 1, the per-period training costs, measured in period 1
dollars, are t 1 1r [f (Xt+1)  f (Xt)] = f (X1) for t > 0, and  1+rr f (X1) for t = 0). The optimal X1
maximizes this expression.
42When L  1rf (1) ; the expert simply sells all knowledge up front.
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f(Xt) each period, with  >  1 capturing the magnitude and sign of the externality.43
In this case, the prot-maximizing knowledge gift satises
f(X1)
f(1)
=
1
e1 C
;
where C = 
1+
h
r0
1 e r0
i
: As expected, this gift is increasing in : a larger externality
accelerates training. Moreover, when  is su¢ ciently large, training ends in one period;
and when  approaches  1; training is stretched to innity.
8 Conclusion
We have shown that a multi-period training arrangement, in which the novice is trained
gradually over time, mitigates the classic problem of transferring general human capital.
Such arrangement allows the novice to eventually acquire all knowledge while at the same
time allowing the expert to prot.
Since the expert uses the promise of future knowledge transfers to retain the novice,
she articially prolongs the novices training. Likely instances of this ine¢ ciency can be
found in both traditional apprenticeships and in high-end professional partnerships. In
the latter case, juniors appear, anecdotally, to spend years paying their dues to the
rmspartners. During those years, juniors are involved in menial work, rather than
being more quickly trained to perform high-value tasks.
We nd that, as players become more patient, training takes longer to complete and
output falls uniformly. The reason is that, as patience increases, knowledge becomes more
valuable in the margin and the expert can keep the novice around with smaller transfers
of additional knowledge. Thus, features that are traditionally considered to a¤ect the
discount factor, such as having more reliable partners, lead to slower transfers and a
lower productivity while the novice is being trained.
Beyond apprenticeships, the model has implications for knowledge transfers in inter-
national alliances and joint ventures. When institutions are weak, contracts between
companies exhibit the same lack of commitment found in training relationships between
43The experts reduced-form objective, viewed from the standpoint of period 1, is now [T (X1)  1] (1+
)f(X1)+
T (X1) 1
1  f (1) ; which captures the impact of the externality during training (embedded in the
rst term) and during every period after that (second term). The optimal X1 maximizes this expression.
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individuals. In this case, the expertpartner may benet from slowing down the knowl-
edge transfer to ensure incentive compatibility while extracting maximum rents.
The present model can be used as a building block for other models of human-capital
acquisition. In future work, we expect to study training hierarchies, where an expert
can train a number of other agents, who in turn can train others. Also of interest is
to study how rms may strengthen their relationships in order to facilitate knowledge
sharing between them. An example is the use of cross-share holdings, typical for instance
of Japanese Keiretsus.
Finally, the empirical evidence we have mentioned is by necessity anecdotal. Future
empirical work is needed to study the extent to which experts articially slow training
down.
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9 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. For the rst part of the Lemma (T is nite), suppose toward a
contradiction that contract C = (yt; wt)1t=0 is optimal (i.e. solves problem (I)) and yet
training takes innitely long i.e. yt < ysup for all t, where ysup = limt!1 yt.
Now select a distant enough period k such that yk  1r [ysup   yk] (which exists because
yk must converge to ysup as k grows) and consider a new contract C 0 = (y0t; w0t)1t=1 that
is identical to C except for the following variables: y0t = w0t = ysup for all t > k; and
w0k = Vk (C)   1rysup  0:44 Namely, in period k; the novice is asked to surrender net
output yk   w0k in exchange for all additional knowledge ysup   yk, with w0k chosen such
that the novices continuation value is una¤ected (Vk (C 0) = w0k + 1rysup = Vk (C)).
We now show that C 0 meets all constraints. Constraint (2) is met because, for all t  k,
1
1 y
0
t =
1
1 yt  Vt (C) = Vt (C 0) ; and, for all t > k, 11 y0t = 11 ysup = Vt (C 0) : Constraint
(3) is met because, for all t < k; wt = w0t; and, for all t  k, w0t  0. Constraint (1) is
met because, for all t > k, t(C 0) = 0; for period k;
k(C 0) = yk   w0k = yk +
1
r
ysup   Vk (C) >
1X
=k
 ky   Vk (C) = k(C)
and therefore k(C 0) > k(C)  0; and, for all t < k; y0t   w0t = yt   wt and therefore
t(C 0)  t(C) = k t [k(C 0)  k(C)] > 0:
Finally, note from the above expression that C 0 delivers a strictly higher prot than C
(namely 0(C 0) > 0(C)), a contradiction.
For the second part of the Lemma (XT = 1), note that if a given contract C (satisfying
all constraints) prescribes a nite graduation date T and prescribes XT < 1; then both
44Since Vk (C)  11 yk (from (2)) we have w0k  yk   1r [ysup   yk]  0:
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playerspayo¤s can be raised by scaling up all variables in C by 1
XT
(while respecting all
constraints).
Proof of Lemma 2. We say that a contract C with graduation date T is a delayed-reward
contract if wt = 0 for all t < T ; and is a quasi-delayed-reward contract if wT 1 2 [0; f (1))
and wt = 0 for all t < T   1: Let D denote the set of delayed-reward contracts and let Q
denote the set of quasi-delayed-reward contracts (note that Q  D).
Step 1. Every optimal contract (i.e. that solves problem (I)) belongs to Q: Let C =
(yt; wt)
1
t=0 be an arbitrary feasible contract (satisfying (1)-(3)) with a nite graduation
date T and a full knowledge transfer. Let C 0 = (y0t; w0t)1t=0 be the (unique) contract in Q
such that:
(a) The novices overall payo¤ is equal under C and C 0, namely,
V0(C) =
1X
t=0
twt =
1X
t=0
tw0t = V0(C 0):
(b) Wages are w0t = f (1) for all t  S; w0S 1 2 [0; f (1)) ; and w0t = 0 for all t < S   1;
where S is dened as the smallest period t such that 
t
1 f (1)  V0(C).45
(c) For all t > 0, the novices incentive constraints (2) hold with equality: Vt(C 0) =
1
1 y
0
t:
Since Vt(C 0) = 11 f (1) for all t  S; and Vt(C 0) = S 1 twS 1 + 
S t
1  f (1) for all t < S;
we have
y0t = f (1) for all t  S; and y0t < f (1) for all t < S:
As a result, the novices graduation date is S.
Contract C 0 has the property that
Vt (C)  Vt (C 0) for all t: (A1)
For t < S; (A1) follows from the fact that
Pt 1
=0 
w0 = 0 and
Pt 1
=0 
w  0:46 And,
45Since V0(C 0) = V0(C); w0S 1 satises 
S 1w0S 1 = V0(C)   
S
1 f (1) ; and therefore w
0
S 1 2 [0; f (1)) :
46Indeed, for all t < S;
tVt (C0) =
1X
=t
w0 =
t 1X
=0
w +
1X
=t
w  tVt (C) ;
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for t  S; (A1) follows from the fact that, owing to the experts incentive constraint (1),
Vt (C)  11 f (1) = Vt (C 0).
Properties (c) and (A1) together imply that yt  y0t for all t: As a result, since C and
C 0 deliver the same payo¤ for the novice, we have
0 (C 0)  0 (C) =
1X
t=0
t [y0t   yt]  0: (A2)
Notice, nally, that C 0 is itself a feasible contract.47
We now show that if C is optimal, it must belong to Q. Suppose instead that C is
optimal and yet C =2 Q: As a result, we must have Pt 1t=0 twt > 0 for some t < T:
We proceed by comparing contracts C and C 0. Since S may be smaller than T; there
are two cases to consider: t < S and t  S: When t < S; we have Pt 1t=0 tw0t = 0 and
therefore
t

Vt (C 0) =
1X
t=t
tw0t =
t 1X
t=0
twt +
1X
t=t
twt > 
tVt (C) :
When instead t  S; we have Vt (C 0) = 11 f (1) > Vt (C) (where the inequality follows
from the fact that (1) requires that 1
1 f (1) > Vt (C) for all t < T; and the fact that
t < T ). Either way, Vt (C 0) > Vt (C) and therefore y0t > yt : It follows from (A2) that
0 (C 0)  0 (C)  t [y0t   yt ] > 0; a contradiction.
Step 2. Every optimal contract belongs to D (as claimed in the Lemma).48 Let C be
an optimal contract. Since C belongs to Q (from Step 1), there exists a period s such that
wt = 0 for all t < s, ws 2 [0; f (1)] ; and wt = yt = f (1) for all t > s: It follows that the
experts prots, as a function of ws and y1; :::; ys; are
0 (C) =
sX
t=1
tyt   sws:
where the second equality follows from the fact that V0 (C0) = V0 (C).
47Constraint (1) is met for all t  1 because t (C0) =
P1
=t 
 ty0  Vt (C0)  11 y0t Vt (C0) = 0; and
it is met for t = 0 because 0 (C) =
P1
=0 
 ty   V0 (C)  0 (otherwise, contract C would not satisfy
constraint (1)) and therefore 0 (C0) =
P1
t=0 
ty0t   V0 (C0) 
P1
t=0 
tyt   V0 (C)  0: Constraints (2)
and (3) (as well as the monotonicity constraint for y0t) are met by construction.
48Notice that, when combined, the two playersincentive constraints require that the novices date of
graduation (the rst date in which output equals f (1)) is equal to the rst date in which wages equal
f (1) :
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Moreover, the novices incentive constraints (2) up to period s are
Vt (C) = s tVs (C)  1
1   yt;
where Vs (C) = ws + 1 f (1) : Since C is assumed to be optimal, and Vt (C) is nondecreas-
ing, all such constraints must hold with equality.
Solving for yt and rearranging terms, we obtain
0 (C) = sws [(1  ) s  1] + constant,
which is linear in ws: (The constant is s
s+1f (1) :) Recall that, by assumption, (1  )n 6=
1 for all n 2 N; and therefore [(1  ) s  1] 6= 0: Since the expert is free to vary ws in
the range [0; f (1)] ; the optimality of C requires that ws 2 f0; f (1)g : As a result, C also
belongs to D:
Proof of Proposition 1. Let C = (yt; wt)1t=0 be an optimal contract. From Lemmas 1
and 2, C has a nite graduation date T , yt = f (1) for all t  T; and wt = 0 for all t < T .
In addition, as noted in the text, (1) and (2) jointly require that wt = f (1) for all t  T .
It follows that the experts prots are
0 (C) =
1X
t=0
t [yt   wt] =
T 1X
t=1
tyt:
Moreover, for all t = 1; :::; T   1; the novices incentive constraints are
Vt (C) = 
T t
1  f (1) 
1
1   yt:
Since Vt (C) is nondecreasing in t; and for any given T the experts objective is in-
creasing in y1; :::; yT 1; all incentive constraints above must hold with equality. Namely,
yt = 
T tf (1) : As a result, for all t = 1; :::; T   1; we have yt+1
yt
= 1 + r and therefore
1
r
[yt+1   yt] = yt;
as claimed in the proposition. Finally, that the knowledge gift X1 is positive follows from
the fact that f (X1) = y1 = 
T 1f (1) > 0:
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider problem (II). After multiplying the objective by
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the constant r0
f(1)
; the problem simplies to
max
X10
f(X1)
f (1)
 log

f (1)
f (X1)

s:t: T (X1) 2 N.
Notice that the average logarithm 1
z
log z is uniquely maximized at z = e: As a result,
when the integer constraint is ignored, the optimal X1 satises
f(X1)
f(1)
= 1
e
and therefore
T (X1)  1 = 1r0 .
When the integer constraint is introduced, since the objective is single-peaked, the
optimal X1 satises either T (X1)  1 =
j
1
r0
k
(the largest integer weakly smaller than 1
r0
)
or T (X1)   1 =
l
1
r0
m
(the smallest integer weakly larger than 1
r0
), depending on which
option delivers the highest prots.
Finally, the optimal gift satises f(1)
f(X1)
= , where  is either (1 + r)
j
1
r0
k
or (1 + r)
l
1
r0
m
.
Since (1 + r)
1
r0 = e; the ratio 
e
; which is either (1 + r)
j
1
r0
k
  1
r0 or (1 + r)
l
1
r0
m
  1
r0 , belongs
to the interval
 
1
1+r
; 1 + r

: Therefore, as r converges to 0, 
e
converges to 1:
Proof of Corollary 1. Part A.We begin by showing that every Pareto-e¢ cient contract
satises the properties in Lemmas 1-2. We do so by pointing out that, other than the
modication below, the proofs of these two results are identical to before. Indeed, these
proofs show that any contract C lacking a desired property is Pareto-dominated by a new
contract C 0 that has the desired property. Specically, C 0 delivers a strictly higher 0 and
a weakly higher V0. (In these proofs, when we call a contract optimalwe now mean
that it solves the Planners problem, rather than the experts.)
The modication is in the proof of Lemma 2, Step 2. Suppose C is a Pareto-e¢ cient
contract. The goal is to show that C belongs to the set of delayed-reward contracts D
(namely, contracts such that wt = 0 for all t < T and wt = f (1) for all t  T ).
We already know (from Step 1) that every optimal contract C belongs to the set of
quasi-delayed-reward contracts Q (namely, contracts such that wt = 0 for all t < T   1;
wT 1 2 [0; f (1)) ; and wt = f (1) for all t  T ). Indeed, Step 1 established that if C does
not belong to Q, then there exist a feasible contract C 0 in Q that Pareto-dominates C
(specically, C 0 delivers a strictly higher 0 and an equal V0).
Since C belongs to Q (which contains D), there must exist a period s such that wt = 0
for all t < s, ws 2 [0; f (1)] ; and wt = f (1) for all t > s: Per the experts incentive
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constraint (1); we must have w0 = 0:49 As a result, we can assume without loss that
period s  1.
The Planners objective, as a function of ws and y1; :::; ys; is therefore
V0(C) + 0(C) = 

sws +
s+1
1   f (1)

+
sX
t=1
tyt   sws:
Moreover, the novices incentive constraints for t = 1; :::; s are
Vt (C) = s tVs (C)  1
1   yt;
where Vs (C) = ws + 1 f (1) : Since the Planners objective is increasing in y1; :::; ys, the
hypothesis that C maximizes this objective requires that all the above incentive constraints
hold with equality.
After substituting for y1; :::; ys (from the incentive constraints) the Planners objective,
now a function of ws only, becomes
sws [(1  ) s  (1  )] + constant,
which is linear in ws: Note that the genericity assumption (i.e. (1  )n 6= 1    for all
n 2 N) implies that [(1  ) s  (1  )] 6= 0: Since the expert is free to vary ws in the
range [0; f (1)] ; the hypothesis that C maximizes the Planners objective requires that
ws 2 f0; f (1)g : As a result, C belongs to D, as desired. The modication in the proof of
Lemma 2 is now complete.
Finally, we show that every Pareto-e¢ cient contract has the properties in Proposition
1. The proof of this result is identical to before, except for the fact that the experts
objective 0 (C) =
PT 1
t=1 
tyt is now replaced by the Planners objective V0(C) + 0(C) =
 
T
1 f (1) +
PT 1
t=1 
tyt: Since for any given T this objective is increasing in y1; :::; yT 1; the
novices incentive constraints for t = 1; :::; T   1 must hold with equality. The remainder
of the proof follows the same steps as before.
Part B. Once we restrict to contracts satisfying Proposition 1, the Planners objective
49If instead w0 > 0; period s would be period 0. In that case, however, the novice would earn payo¤
w0 +

1 f (1) ; which exceeds the present value of all output

1 f (1) (from the standpoint of period 0).
As a result, the experts payo¤ 0 (C) would be negative.
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(expressed in date-0 dollars) is

1
r
f (X1)| {z }
V0 =
T
1  f(1)
+  [T (X1)  1] f(X1)| {z };
0
where T (X1)   1 = 1r0 log
h
f(1)
f(X1)
i
. When the integer constraint is ignored, the optimal
ratio f(X1)
f(1)
equals min

1
e1 A ; 1
	
; where A = r0
1 e r0 .
50 Therefore, T (X1)  1 = D; where
D = max
n
1 A
r0
; 0
o
. When the integer constraint is introduced, since the objective is
single-peaked, T (X1)   1 is either bDc or dDe and X1 satises f(X1)f(1) = 1 , where 
is either (1 + r)bDc or (1 + r)dDe. (Since min

1
e1 A ; 1
	
= (1 + r) D, and 1

converges to
(1 + r) D when r converges to zero, it follows that f(X1)
f(1)
converges to min

1
e1 A ; 1
	
when
r converges to zero.)
Proof of Corollary 2. Lemmas 1 and 2 remain valid under the minimum wage
policy, with the modication that, before graduation, the wage earned over and above
the minimum wage wt   wmin takes the place formerly occupied by the wage wt. After
this modication, the proof of Lemma 1 remains valid, with period k chosen so that
yk wmin  1r [ysup   yk]. And the proof of Lemma 2 remains valid, with a delayed-reward
contract now requiring that wt = wmin for all t < T ; and a quasi-delayed-reward contract
now requiring that wT 1 2 [wmin; f (1)) and wt = wmin for all t < T   1:
Finally, the proof of the present Corollary is identical to the proof of Proposition 1,
with the exception that prots are now
PT 1
t=1 
t [yt   wmin] and the novices incentive
constraints for t = 1; :::; T   1 are now
1  T t
1   wmin +
T t
1  f (1) 
1
1   yt:
Once these constraints bind, we obtain yt   wmin = T t [f (1)  wmin] and therefore
1
r
[yt+1   yt] = yt   wmin:
Proof of Corollary 3. Denote the novices graduation date T (X1; wmin) = 1 +
1
r0
log
h
f(1) wmin
f(X1) wmin
i
. Notice that problem (III) is identical to problem (II) in the base-
line model, but with f (X1) wmin in the place of f (X1) and f (1) wmin in the place of
50This result is obtained by multiplying the objective by 1f(1) ; taking a rst-order condition for the
ratio f(X1)f(1) , namely, 
1
r + 
1
r0
h
log
h
f(1)
f(X1)
i
  1
i
= 0, and rearranging terms (note that r = 1   e r0).
The second-order condition is   1r0
f(1)
f(X1)
< 0:
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f (1) (and subject to the constraint that T (X1; wmin) is an integer).
As a result, when the integer constraint is ignored, the solution satises f(1) wmin
f(X1) wmin = e
and T (X1; wmin)   1 = 1r0 . And when the integer constraint is introduced, the solution
satises f(1) wmin
f(X1) wmin = ; where  is either (1 + r)
j
1
r0
k
or (1 + r)
l
1
r0
m
, and T (X1; wmin)  1
is either
j
1
r0
k
or
l
1
r0
m
. (As before, when r converges to 0;  converges to e:)
Moreover, since net output f (Xt)  wmin grows at rate r during training, we obtain
f(Xt)  wmin
f (1)  wmin =
1

(1 + r)t 1 for all t  T (X1; wmin);
which implies that f (Xt) is increasing in wmin for all t < T (X1; wmin).
Proof of Proposition 3. For any given graduation T; the experts problem is
max
(yt;wt)
T 1
t=1
T 1X
t=1
t 1 [yt   wt]
s.t. Vt  1
1  u (yt) ,
wt  0; yt 2 [0; f (1)] and nondecreasing,
where Vt =
PT 1
=t 
 tu (w ) + 
T t
1  u (f (1)).
51 Let t denote the Lagrange multiplier for
the period t incentive constraint.
Now suppose T is the optimal graduation date. We begin by ignoring the monotonicity
constraint for yt. In the resulting relaxed problem, all incentive constraints bind (otherwise
prots can be raised by raising yt). Moreover, the Inada condition u0 (0) = 1 implies
that wt > 0 (and therefore yt > 0), and since by hypothesis the novices graduation is at
time T; we also have yt < 1 for all t < T . As a result, the solution to the relaxed problem
is interior and therefore characterized by the rst-order conditions u0 (wt)
Pt
=1 
t  =
t 1 and t =
(1 )t 1
u0(yt) ; together with
1
1 u (yt) = Vt.
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51That there exists an optimal contract follows from noting that, without loss, we can bound wt above
by some nite number W . As a result, for any arbitrary T; the above problem has a solution: it consists
of maximizing a continuous function over a compact set. Moreover, that an optimal T exists follows from
noting that every contract in which training never ends is dominated by one in which training ends in
nite time (which follows from an argument analogous to that in Lemma 1).
52That these conditions describe a maximum follows from the fact that there is a unique contract
(yt; wt)
T 1
t=1 that satises them (and the fact that the experts problem has an interior solution).
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By combining the rst-order conditions and rearranging terms, we obtain
wt = (1  ) 1Yt;
where Yt =
 Pt
=1 y


 1
 : (Given that Yt is increasing in t, so are wt and Vt:) Moreover,
since we can write u (wt) + Vt+1 = Vt; and 11 u (yt) = Vt; we obtain u (wt) +
1
r
u (yt+1) =
1
1 u (yt) : After rearranging terms, this equality is
1
r
[u (yt+1)  u (yt)] = u (yt)  u (wt) :
Finally, focusing on the above relaxed problem is appropriate (namely, the monotonic-
ity constraint for yt is redundant) because the solution to the relaxed problem satises
1
1 u (yt) = Vt; with Vt increasing.
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